2024 in review: Western Balkans between EU integration and persisting tensions

The Western Balkans continued to navigate a challenging dual dynamic in 2024: the pursuit of European Union (EU) integration on the one hand and the enduring shadow of inter-ethnic tensions on the other. The year highlighted the region’s potential to move closer to EU membership but also underscored how historical grievances and unresolved disputes still hinder long-term stability.

Progress on EU integration: The renewed focus on expanding the European Union by integrating new member states from the Western Balkans and Eastern Europe gained further momentum in 2024 due to geopolitical shifts, global challenges, and the EU’s strategic interest in promoting stability, democracy, and economic growth in its neighbourhood.

• Albania made substantial strides in advancing its EU accession negotiations in 2024. It became the first negotiating country that opened two clusters of negotiations in just two months. The EU decision to open the first cluster of accession negotiations in October marked a major milestone in Albania’s EU accession process. It was an acknowledgement of Albania’s progress in implementing critical reforms, particularly in areas like rule of law, public administration, and judiciary reforms, which are essential for the country’s path to EU membership. Cluster 1 – ‘Fundamentals’ – focuses on essential reforms related to the rule of law. The EU decided to open a further group of chapters of accession negotiations with Albania in December – cluster 6 focusing on external relations. The Albanian government’s objective to close accession negotiations by the end of 2027 received support by the European Commission whose Enlargement package in October stated that ‘the Commission is ready to support this ambitious objective’. 
• In North Macedonia the lack of political consensus to enact the constitutional changes recognizing Bulgarians as a minority, as part of the formal EU accession process, meant that the country’s EU accession process once again reached an impasse. The victory of nationalist VMRO DPMNE in May was influenced by various factors, but the country’s lack of progress in EU accession was undoubtedly a key contributor. The new government opposes amending the constitution to include Bulgarians as a national minority under the current circumstances. Instead, it advocates for a new agreement stipulating that this change should occur only upon North Macedonia’s entry into the EU, expressing concerns that Bulgaria might otherwise introduce additional demands during the process. With Bulgaria’s internal political instability persisting and Skopje’s reluctance to concede further to its neighbor’s demands, the path forward remains uncertain.
• Montenegro is at the most advanced stage of the negotiations. The fulfilment of the interim benchmarks for the rule of law chapters (Chapters 23 and 24) allows the closing process of all negotiation chapters to start. At the sixteenth meeting of the Accession Conference with Montenegro in June, the EU confirmed that Montenegro has met the interim benchmarks set for Chapters 23 and 24, paving the way for the country to start the process of closing chapters in the accession negotiations. Three chapters were closed in December and a total of six negotiating chapters have been provisionally closed.
• Serbia’s EU aspirations were complicated by its wavering stance on aligning foreign policy with EU positions, particularly regarding sanctions against Russia and its relations with China. In December, a number of EU countries blocked the decision to open a new chapter of accession negotiations. TheDutch Foreign Minister Caspar Veldkamp stated that ‘there is insufficient progress in the area of the rule of law in Serbia. At the same time, we see insufficient progress in the relationship between Belgrade and Pristina. Serbia also has a clear responsibility there. We see that Serbia is still not sufficiently aligning its foreign policy with EU foreign policy.’
• The year also saw renewed attention on Bosnia and Herzegovina. In March the EU decided to open accession negotiations with the country, but the actual start of the process remains conditional on the country fulfilling all the 14 key priorities set out in the Commission Opinion on its EU membership application. Namely, Bosnia and Herzegovina needs to undertake further constitutional and electoral reforms to ensure equality and non-discrimination of all citizens. The EU remains seriously concerned about legislation and initiatives in the Republika Srpska entity that run counter to the EU path of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including secessionist rhetoric and questioning the constitutional order of the country. 
• In 2024, Kosovo’s efforts to secure visa liberalization for its citizens culminated successfully, marking a symbolic step toward EU integration. However, no progress was made towards the examination of Kosovo’s application for EU membership and towards the abolition of EU restrictive measures on the country. The EU has adopted these measures in response to the actions of the Kosovo Government in the majority Serb north of the country. The EU measures against Kosovo include the temporary suspension of the institutions of the Stabilization and Association Agreement and a host of economic measures such as the suspension of the programming of IPA 2024 funds (Pre-Accession Instrument). However, following an armed attack against Kosovo Police in September 2023 in Banjska, by ethnic Serb gunmen, and a number of de-escalation measures undertaken by the Kosovo Government, including granting ethnic Serbs the possibility to vote for the dismissal of the newly installed Albanian mayors, the mood in the EU seems to have shifted. A majority of the member states support the abolition of the measures, while some member states are in favour of a gradual removal. The conclusions of the European Council in December state that ‘the EU will gradually lift these measures in parallel with further steps by Kosovo to de-escalate the tensions in the north’.

Tensions persist: While the region made strides toward integration, 2024 was also a year of renewed inter-ethnic tensions, particularly in Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and North Macedonia. These issues were stark reminders of the unresolved disputes that continue to polarize communities.

• Kosovo-Serbia relations: The normalization dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia, mediated by the EU, hit several roadblocks in 2024. Sporadic violence in northern Kosovo—an area with a significant Serb minority—heightened tensions, with both sides accusing each other of incitement. Efforts to implement the Ohrid Agreement, which aimed among other things to establish mechanisms for self-management in Serb-majority municipalities, were met with resistance in both countries.

The EU’s attempts to mediate were further complicated by domestic political dynamics in Serbia, where hardline rhetoric gained traction. Kosovo’s leadership, under Prime Minister Albin Kurti, faced criticism for its handling of the crisis, as opposition parties accused the government of jeopardizing relations with key international allies.

Central issues include Serbia’s refusal to extradite Milan Radoičić, accused of orchestrating the 2023 Banjskë attack, and the recent explosion at Kosovo’s Ibër-Lepenc canal.

Kosovo’s government has linked the November 29 explosion at the Ibër-Lepenc canal, to Serbian actors with alleged Russian involvement. Evidence presented includes confiscated weaponry and military materials, with some bearing Russian insignias. “This is part of a broader campaign to undermine Kosovo’s sovereignty,” Kurti has said.

Serbian President Vučić has denied any Serbian involvement in the Ibër-Lepenc explosion and expressed willingness to cooperate with international investigations. He has dismissed Kosovo’s allegations as politically motivated provocations

Critics have called for the EU to adopt a firmer approach, particularly with Serbia. The EU’s failure to secure significant progress on accountability and alignment with EU foreign policy has raised concerns about its ability to act as an effective mediator. Analysts argue that Brussels must demand Serbia extradite Radoičić, comply with normalization agreements, and impose sanctions on Russia to uphold EU values and regional stability. As the EU intensifies its mediation efforts, it faces the challenge of balancing dialogue with accountability to ensure lasting peace and integration in the region.

• Bosnia and Herzegovina: a divided federation. Bosnia and Herzegovina’s ethnic divisions deepened in 2024, particularly between the Bosniak-Croat Federation and the Serb-majority Republika Srpska. Milorad Dodik, the hardline leader of Republika Srpska, continued to defy the authority of the central government. His rhetoric—frequently laced with secessionist undertones—stoked fears of a return to instability.

The international community, including the Office of the High Representative (OHR), struggled to mediate effectively. Economic stagnation and a lack of political will to implement reforms exacerbated the situation, leaving ordinary citizens increasingly disillusioned.

• North Macedonia: identity politics resurface. In North Macedonia, tensions related to national identity and historical narratives flared up again. The country’s ongoing disputes with Bulgaria over language and history delayed further progress in EU accession talks. Domestically, ethnic divisions between Macedonians and ethnic Albanians became once again a very sensitive issue.

On October 9, the Constitutional Court in North Macedonia decided to abolish the ‘Balancer’, a software mechanism that regulated the “fair and adequate” representation of ethnic communities in public administration. The legal provisions on ethnic quotas in the public sector were introduced as part of the Ohrid Framework Agreement, which ended an armed conflict with ethnic Albanian militants in 2001. They aim to ensure equitable representation of ethnic communities. 

The ruling VMRO-DPMNE party has claimed that the mechanism has been misused, leading to an overstaffed public sector filled with party clients. The party is in favour of new legal provisions to ensure equitable representation while preventing abuse. However, no alternative provisions have been proposed yet. The grouping of Albanian political parties in the Government, VLEN, has promised that the “Balancer” mechanism will be replaced by a new law, which will also determine employment according to ethnicity.

Moreover, North Macedonia’s Constitutional Court is set to decide on the future of the Law on the Use of Languages, which was adopted seven years ago. The Law requires state institutions in North Macedonia to officially accommodate languages spoken by at least 20% of the population. This includes Albanian, which is recognized in the first article of the law as the language of a significant portion of the population. Under this law, official items like coins, postage stamps, police and firefighter uniforms must include inscriptions in any language spoken by at least 20% of the population, a measure aimed at supporting the linguistic identity of Albanians and other ethnic groups in the country.

These moves fuelled inter-ethnic tensions in North Macedonia, where relations between the ethnic Macedonian majority and the ethnic Albanian community, which comprises about 30% of the population, remain shaky.

The role of international actors: The involvement of international actors was a critical factor in shaping the region’s trajectory in 2024. The EU’s engagement—while pivotal—faced criticism for its perceived inconsistency. In some cases, member states’ divisions undermined the bloc’s ability to present a unified stance on key issues.

The United States maintained its strategic interest in the region, particularly in countering Russian influence. However, Washington’s focus on other global crises limited its direct engagement. Since Kosovo declared independence in 2008, the U.S. has been one of its most important international backers. However, the new Trump administration’s more unpredictable and less ideologically driven approach to foreign policy could create uncertainty for Kosovo. President Trump’s first term in the White House was characterized by tense relations with prime minister Albin Kurti’s first government. One issue that garnered great attention during President Trump’s first term was the proposal for territorial exchanges between Kosovo and Serbia. As a matter of fact, Trump’s first administration emphasized economic normalization over a political solution and advocacy for Kosovo’s independence. A return to this approach could shift international pressure away from a comprehensive resolution, leaving Kosovo in a state of limbo, and emboldening Serbia in its opposition to Kosovo’s statehood.

Russia and China continued to wield influence, particularly in Serbia and Republika Srpska. Russia’s support for nationalist rhetoric in Serbia and its backing of Dodik’s secessionist agenda in Bosnia served to destabilize the region further. Meanwhile, China’s investments in infrastructure projects across the Western Balkans raised concerns about economic dependency and transparency.

Socio-economic challenges: In addition to political and ethnic issues, the Western Balkans faced significant socio-economic challenges in 2024. High unemployment rates, brain drain, and inadequate public services remained pervasive problems. While EU pre-accession funds provided some relief, their impact was often diluted by inefficiencies and corruption.

Climate change also emerged as a pressing issue, with the region experiencing severe floods and heatwaves throughout the year. These events highlighted the need for comprehensive environmental policies, which are often deprioritized in favor of immediate political and economic concerns.

Looking ahead: The events of 2024 underscored the Western Balkans’ dual narrative: one of hope through EU integration and one of persistent challenges rooted in history and identity. For the region to move forward, several key steps are necessary:

1. Strengthening EU Engagement: The EU must adopt a more consistent and proactive approach, ensuring that enlargement remains a credible process. Conditionality should be balanced with tangible rewards for progress, such as increased financial support and clearer timelines for accession.
2. Resolving Bilateral Disputes: Kosovo and Serbia’s normalization dialogue and North Macedonia’s negotiations with Bulgaria require sustained international mediation. Creative solutions that respect the interests of all parties will be essential.
3. Promoting Inclusive Governance: Addressing ethnic divisions within countries like Bosnia and Herzegovina and North Macedonia demands a commitment to inclusive governance and reconciliation. Civil society organizations and grassroots initiatives should play a greater role in bridging divides.
4. Addressing Socio-Economic Issues: Tackling unemployment, brain drain, and environmental challenges will require coordinated efforts between governments, the private sector, and international donors. Investments in education, green energy, and digital infrastructure could provide a pathway to sustainable development.

The Western Balkans’ journey in 2024 highlighted both the promise of EU integration and the weight of unresolved historical and ethnic tensions. As the region steps into 2025, its leaders and international partners must redouble their efforts to navigate these challenges. The stakes are high, not just for the Western Balkans but for the stability and unity of Europe as a whole.